
5.2 — Rambam vs. Abarbanel: Belief, Knowledge, and the Shape of Mitzvah #1
Machlokes in Foundations
Few disagreements cut as deeply into Torah architecture as the dispute between Rambam and Abarbanel over Mitzvah #1. Both stand before the same verse—[אָנֹכִי ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ — “I am Hashem your G-d”]—and draw opposite conclusions about what a mitzvah can be.
Rambam counts Anochi as the first commandment: to know that there is a G-d. Abarbanel resists: belief cannot be commanded; obligation must presuppose authority. What appears technical is, in truth, a machlokes about the very shape of mitzvah.
Rambam’s position is explicit and uncompromising. In his count of the mitzvot, Anochi is Mitzvah #1—the obligation to know that Hashem exists. Crucially, Rambam does not say “to believe.” He says leida—to know.
For Rambam, knowledge is an act:
Because knowledge admits degrees and discipline, it can be commanded. The mitzvah does not ask the impossible (“believe at will”), but the necessary: align one’s intellect with reality.
Abarbanel’s objection is surgical. A command only binds if authority is already accepted. But Anochi is the first articulation of authority. To command belief at that moment is circular: why should I obey a command whose authority has not yet been established?
Abarbanel therefore insists:
From this angle, Anochi cannot be a mitzvah among mitzvot.
This is not merely a disagreement about counting. It is a disagreement about what mitzvah is.
Rambam trusts the intellect to receive command. Abarbanel insists the intellect must first encounter authority.
The tension dissolves when we notice that Rambam and Abarbanel may be describing different stages of the same process.
At Sinai:
Rambam’s mitzvah is not the birth of belief, but its custody. Abarbanel guards the doorway; Rambam regulates life inside.
Both thinkers quietly agree on one thing: belief is too weak a category. Sinai does not produce belief; it produces knowledge. The disagreement is about whether that knowledge is the object of command or the condition for command.
This reframes the debate as a machlokes in foundations, not conclusions.
Notice what neither side allows:
Rambam gives mitzvah philosophical reach. Abarbanel gives it logical integrity. Together, they preserve Torah from both mysticism and reductionism.
Chassidic masters often reconcile the two by distinguishing etzem and hisgalus: essence and expression. The truth of Anochi is encountered; the work of knowing it is commanded. What is given once must be lived daily.
Thus, Anochi is both foundation and mitzvah—depending on where one stands.
Modern culture treats belief as opinion and knowledge as power. Rambam and Abarbanel jointly reject both. Truth is not chosen, and it is not weaponized. It is received—and then guarded.
Mitzvah #1 teaches that obligation begins where reality is acknowledged and continues wherever knowledge is protected.
📖 Sources


5.2 — Rambam vs. Abarbanel: Belief, Knowledge, and the Shape of Mitzvah #1
Machlokes in Foundations
Few disagreements cut as deeply into Torah architecture as the dispute between Rambam and Abarbanel over Mitzvah #1. Both stand before the same verse—[אָנֹכִי ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ — “I am Hashem your G-d”]—and draw opposite conclusions about what a mitzvah can be.
Rambam counts Anochi as the first commandment: to know that there is a G-d. Abarbanel resists: belief cannot be commanded; obligation must presuppose authority. What appears technical is, in truth, a machlokes about the very shape of mitzvah.
Rambam’s position is explicit and uncompromising. In his count of the mitzvot, Anochi is Mitzvah #1—the obligation to know that Hashem exists. Crucially, Rambam does not say “to believe.” He says leida—to know.
For Rambam, knowledge is an act:
Because knowledge admits degrees and discipline, it can be commanded. The mitzvah does not ask the impossible (“believe at will”), but the necessary: align one’s intellect with reality.
Abarbanel’s objection is surgical. A command only binds if authority is already accepted. But Anochi is the first articulation of authority. To command belief at that moment is circular: why should I obey a command whose authority has not yet been established?
Abarbanel therefore insists:
From this angle, Anochi cannot be a mitzvah among mitzvot.
This is not merely a disagreement about counting. It is a disagreement about what mitzvah is.
Rambam trusts the intellect to receive command. Abarbanel insists the intellect must first encounter authority.
The tension dissolves when we notice that Rambam and Abarbanel may be describing different stages of the same process.
At Sinai:
Rambam’s mitzvah is not the birth of belief, but its custody. Abarbanel guards the doorway; Rambam regulates life inside.
Both thinkers quietly agree on one thing: belief is too weak a category. Sinai does not produce belief; it produces knowledge. The disagreement is about whether that knowledge is the object of command or the condition for command.
This reframes the debate as a machlokes in foundations, not conclusions.
Notice what neither side allows:
Rambam gives mitzvah philosophical reach. Abarbanel gives it logical integrity. Together, they preserve Torah from both mysticism and reductionism.
Chassidic masters often reconcile the two by distinguishing etzem and hisgalus: essence and expression. The truth of Anochi is encountered; the work of knowing it is commanded. What is given once must be lived daily.
Thus, Anochi is both foundation and mitzvah—depending on where one stands.
Modern culture treats belief as opinion and knowledge as power. Rambam and Abarbanel jointly reject both. Truth is not chosen, and it is not weaponized. It is received—and then guarded.
Mitzvah #1 teaches that obligation begins where reality is acknowledged and continues wherever knowledge is protected.
📖 Sources




“Rambam vs. Abarbanel: Belief, Knowledge, and the Shape of Mitzvah #1”
אָנֹכִי ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ
According to Rambam, this mitzvah commands the ongoing alignment of intellect with revealed reality. According to Abarbanel, it names the authority upon which all command rests. The mitzvah thus functions both as foundation and obligation.
שְׁמַע יִשְׂרָאֵל ה׳ אֱלֹקֵינוּ ה׳ אֶחָד
Unity ensures that obligation flows from a single, coherent source. Rambam treats this as knowledge to be affirmed; Abarbanel treats it as the metaphysical condition that makes mitzvah possible.
אֶת ה׳ אֱלֹקֶיךָ תִּירָא
Yirah stabilizes the relationship between truth and obligation. Whether knowledge is commanded or presupposed, reverence preserves its binding force without coercion.


“Rambam vs. Abarbanel: Belief, Knowledge, and the Shape of Mitzvah #1”
Parshas Yisro opens the covenant with “Anochi,” prompting foundational questions about belief, authority, and command. Rambam and Abarbanel’s dispute clarifies how revelation becomes binding law—through encounter that gives rise to commanded knowledge.

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